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INTRODUCTION
In its 1966 Miranda decision, the Supreme Court announced that a criminal
defendant's statement, if made during custodial interrogation, would not be
admissible in state or federal court if the police failed to advise the defendant
of her right to remain silent and have an attorney present during the question-
ing.' Two years later, Congress attempted to "legislatively overrule" Miranda
as applied in federal court. Based on Congress's power to make the rules of
evidence and procedure for the federal courts, Section 3501 of the Omnibus
Crime Control Act of 1968 dictated that a defendant's statement to the police
during custodial interrogation would be admissible as long as it was made vol-
untarily.2 This had been the standard for admitting confessions before
Miranda, and it required courts to determine by a totality of the evidence
whether the police had "overborne" the defendant's "will.",
3
For thirty years this conflict between Supreme Court precedent and con-
gressional statute has remained dormant. Scholars, public officials, and justices
have occasionally raised the issue, 4 but with the Justice Department consis-
tently refusing to invoke Section 3501, federal courts have continued to apply
Miranda.5 The conflict resurfaced this past year, however, when the Fourth
Law clerk to the Honorable Phyllis Kravitch, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, 1999-2000. The author would like to thank Professor Gerald Gunther for his support and construc-
tive critiques of this Article in draft form. Thanks also to Richard Frankel of the Yale Law & Policy Re-
view, whose careful attention, thoughtful questions, and plentiful suggestions helped me fill in some of
the Article's loose ends and weak links.
1. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994); see also infra notes 179-185 and accompanying text.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 122-124.
4. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462-465 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring); 3
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROME H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.1, at 317-18 (2d ed. 1999) (dis-
cussing standing issues); Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title 11: A Morgantic Marriage, 1969 SUP. CT.
REV. 81 (1969); Office of Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney General on the Law of Pretrial Interro-
gation: 'Truth in Criminal Justice' Report No. 1 (Feb. 12, 1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
437, 512-19 (1989).
5. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 463-64 (Scalia, J., concurring); cf Office of Legal Policy, supra note 4, at
519-21. In the mid-1970s, the Tenth Circuit analyzed the Miranda line of cases and concluded that a
district court "did not err in applying the guidelines of § 3501 in determining the issue of the voluntari-
ness of [the defendant's] confession." See United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129, 1138 (10th Cir.
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Circuit held, in United States v. Dickerson,6 that Congress had effectively over-
ruled Miranda and that voluntariness determines the admissibility of confes-
sions in federal court.
7
Dickerson gives judicial validation to the persistent critics who question the
wisdom and legitimacy of Miranda.8 The decision prompted a flurry of news
reports and commentaries in both the general media and legal publications.
9
Dickerson also caught the attention of the Supreme Court, which granted cer-
tiorari in the case.10 Oral arguments have already been held, and the Supreme
Court should issue its decision this summer. Finally, Dickerson prompted this
Article, which investigates both the Supreme Court's power to prescribe the
prophylactic Miranda warnings and exclusionary rule, and Congress's power
to reject or at least respond to the Miranda decision.
After reviewing the statutory language and legislative history, the Fourth
Circuit in Dickerson concluded that "Congress enacted Section 3501 with the
express purpose of legislatively overruling Miranda and restoring voluntari-
ness as the test for admitting confessions in federal court."" Whether Congress
has the power to do so, according to the court, turns on whether "the rule set
forth in Miranda is required by the Constitution."'12 If so, Congress's hands are
tied, because it cannot "supersede a Supreme Court decision construing the
Constitution."'13 On the other hand, if the Miranda warnings are not constitu-
tionally compelled, then the decision simply provides a rule of evidence. And
Congress has the power to overrule judicially created rules of evidence and
1975). The Court's conclusion can be read as dicta, however, because the court also held that the law
enforcement officials had fully complied with Miranda. See id. The case has largely been ignored.
6. 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999).
7. The defendant, Charles Dickerson, confessed to being the getaway driver in a series of bank rob-
beries after FBI agents brought him to a field office for questioning and told him that they were about to
search his apartment. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 674. Dickerson claimed that he confessed before the
FBI gave him his Miranda warnings. An FBI agent testified that he administered the warnings before
Dickerson's confession, but the district court found Dickerson's testimony more credible. See id. at 675-
76. The district court suppressed Dickerson's statement because of the Miranda violation, but specifi-
cally held that Dickerson gave the statement voluntarily. See id. at 676. The government did not argue to
the Fourth Circuit that the confession was admissible under § 3501, but an amicus curiae briefed the
issue. See id. at 695 (Michael, J., dissenting).
8. See, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question ofArticle III
Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100 (1986). This Article focuses on the issue of legitimacy-did the
Court have the power to do as it did in Miranda? Of course, there are other reasons to criticize the deci-
sion, and they are discussed briefly in the Conclusion.
9. See Don't Worry, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 1, 1999, at A20; William Glaberson, After 33 Years of Con-
troversy, Miranda Ruling Faces Its Most Serious Challenge, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1999, at A24; Yale
Kamisar, The Miranda Warning Takes a Body Blow, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 17, 1999, at B7; David E. Rov-
ella, Miranda Upheaval Unlikely, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 1, 1999, at Al; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda Now
on the Endangered Species List, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 1, 1999, at A22.
10. See Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999).
11. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 686.
12. Id. at 687.
13. Id. at 687 (citing City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997)).
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procedure that are not required by the Constitution. 4
As Dickerson points out, the Miranda decision does not identify the con-
stitutional basis for its holding and expressly leaves Congress and the States
some flexibility to develop their own safeguards for protecting the Fifth
Amendment privilege.15 Reviewing the post-Miranda jurisprudence, Dickerson
notes that the Supreme Court frequently refers to the Miranda warnings as
prophylactic and has concluded that the exclusionary rule of Miranda may
keep out some voluntary confessions that were obtained without violating the
Fifth Amendment. 16 To the Dickerson court, it is crystal clear that the rule ex-
cluding confessions obtained without Miranda warnings is not constitutionally
required.' 7 The court's reasoning can be summarized succinctly: Because there
is no Fifth Amendment right to Miranda warnings per se, States and the Con-
gress are free to ignore Miranda.
By limiting its evaluation of Miranda to whether or not the specific warn-
ings suggested by the Warren Court are required by the Constitution, however,
the Fourth Circuit misses the broader constitutional message of Miranda,
which can be described in the following terms. The Fifth Amendment demands
that suspects have a true and continuous opportunity to exercise their privilege
against self-incrimination. This requires that suspects be aware of their rights
and that the inherently coercive aspects of police interrogation be mitigated to
ensure that a suspect's decision is unfettered. Finally, courts cannot assume
that the Fifth Amendment's demands have been met through fact-intensive
analysis of interrogations; therefore bright line rules are necessary.
Critics of Miranda make the same mistake as the Fourth Circuit by focus-
ing narrowly on the Court's proposed warnings. The critics believe that the re-
sort to prophylactic rules is an illegitimate exercise in policymaking, and that
Miranda "reads more like a legislative committee report with an accompanying
statute."'8 The federal courts lack the states' police power and the power to
make or implement policy held by the other co-equal branches of government,
the legislature and executive.19 Like the Fourth Circuit, this critique reflects an
overly cramped view of Miranda's holding. It also reflects an overly narrow
view of the Supreme Court's power to protect constitutional rights more gener-
ally.
14. See id. at 687 (citing the following cases: Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996);
Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265 (1980); Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 345-48 (1959)).
15. See id. at 688-89.
16. See id at 689-90 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985)).
17. See id. at 690 ("As a consequence, the irrebuttable presumption created by the Court in
Miranda-that a confession obtained without the warnings is presumed involuntary-is a fortiori not
required by the Constitution.").
18. David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CI. L. REv. 190, 190 (1988).
19. Cf Office of Legal Policy, supra note 4, at 543 (arguing that applying Miranda violates the
constitutional separation of powers and basic principles of federalism).
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Appreciating the legitimacy of Miranda requires an understanding of the
Court's authority to make prophylactic rules. And assessing the legitimacy of
Congress's response to Miranda requires an understanding of the flexibility
that States and the Congress have in reacting to Court decisions that extend be-
yond defining a constitutional right.20
A number of scholars have written about the Supreme Court's authority to
proscribe state activity that does not definitively violate a constitutional right.
John Kaplan first hinted at, and Lawrence Crocker later refined, a theory of
contingent constitutional requirements. 21 According to this theory, govern-
mental actions that are not inherently or absolutely unconstitutional can none-
theless violate the Constitution if "particular institutional and empirical facts"
or realities exist.22 Henry Monaghan claimed that the Supreme Court possesses
a constitutional common law power that explains numerous cases creating a
"substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their in-
spiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provi-
sions. 23 Joseph Grano has suggested that the judicial power includes the
authority to do all that is "necessary and proper" to fulfill its responsibilities,
and that many issues of constitutional law beyond defining the scope of rights
pose federal questions that the courts may decide. 24 Finally, David Strauss of-
fers not a theory but a description of Supreme Court adjudicatory techniques,
noting that the use of overprotective rules is pervasive in the resolution of con-
stitutional issues. 25 Another scholar, Robert Burt, focuses on a different branch,
exploring Congress's power to elaborate on or further the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
2 6
Drawing on this previous scholarship, this Article suggests a way of cate-
gorizing the judiciary and the legislature's power to regulate the broad spec-
27trum of governmental action. The Supreme Court has the authority to define
20. While § 3501 only applies in federal courts, and the federal judiciary and Congress figure
prominently in this Article, any theory justifying Miranda and concerning prophylactic rules more gen-
erally must apply to the states as well. After all, Miranda and other prophylactic rules apply to state as
well as federal courts. Moreover, Congress has unlimited discretion to overturn any exercise of the su-
pervisory power by the Supreme Court to manage the federal judiciary. Language in Miranda and other
relevant cases indicates that the Supreme Court does not believe its prophylactic rules are so vulnerable.
For the purposes of this Article it is irrelevant that § 3501 only applies to federal courts, and references
to constitutional violations could refer to actions by federal or state officials.
21. See Lawrence Crocker, Can the Exclusionary Rule Be Saved?, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
310, 312 (1993); John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1029-30,
1055 (1974).
22. Crocker, supra note 21, at 322-26.
23. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Forward: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1975).
24. See Grano, supra note 8, at 100.
25. See Strauss, supra note 18, at 190.
26. See Burt, supra note 4, at 81.
27. Particularly valuable are the contributions of Henry Monaghan and Lawrence Crocker. Mona-
ghan's insight was placing the Supreme Court's constitutional adjudication into two categories: on the
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the scope of constitutional rights. The Court also has the authority to proscribe
governmental action that does not itself definitively violate constitutional rights
for one of two reasons. First, some activities pose a high risk of violating rights
and are resistant to effective, accurate judicial scrutiny. Second, some activities
chill the exercise of rights or render their exercise useless. Preventing govem-
ment action of these sorts can be described as a "contingent requirement" of
the constitutional right that the action endangers.28 Congress may supersede the
Court's remedy for such situations, but it must be responsive to the Court's
constitutional concerns. Finally, the Court has no authority to extend protection
against government activities that may affect rights, but that do not impinge
their effective exercise. To do so, the Court would exceed its role as interpreter
of the Constitution, defender of individual rights, and decider of cases. In this
expanded role, the Court would, instead, interfere with the legislature's power.
When Miranda is analyzed through this schema, it becomes clear that the
Court was well within its power to require warnings by the police in the ab-
sence of an equally effective policy by the legislature.29 The Fifth Amendment
may not demand the formulaic recital of the famous Miranda warnings, but it
does forbid coerced confessions. The compulsion inherent in custodial interro-
gation, however, has made it impossible to craft an effective test of voluntari-
ness.30 Furthermore, there are positive values associated with the exercise of
the Fifth Amendment privilege.31 Allowing the police to launch into interroga-
tions of suspects who are intimidated or unaware of their rights would "chill"
their invocation, and a jailhouse confession renders the Fifth Amendment close
to useless to an accused at trial.32
Analyzing Section 3501 with the understanding that Congress must address
the Court's concerns when it supersedes a Court-created remedy reveals that
one hand, authoritative interpretation of integral or inherent aspects of the Constitution, and on the other
hand, constitutional common law, which includes implementation of procedural rules inspired, but not
required, by the Constitution. See Monaghan, supra note 23, at 2-3, 23. Monaghan believes that Con-
gress has an unrestricted ability to modify or reject Supreme Court adjudication in the second category.
See id. at 3. This view, however, is at odds with language common throughout the cases Monaghan cites
as examples of constitutional common law, specifically the Bivens cases, and most importantly,
Miranda. Those cases limit congressional modification or replacement of Court-created remedies to
alternatives that offer comparable protection for constitutional rights. See infra notes 114-118 and ac-
companying text. Crocker, trying to save the exclusionary rule, suggests that some government action
that may not inherently violate constitutional rights may do so "contingent upon certain institutional and
empirical facts." Crocker, supra note 21, at 322. This Article takes the best insights of both authors,
drawing on Monaghan's categorization of Supreme Court adjudication and Crocker's theory of contin-
gent constitutional violations.
28. This Article argues that Supreme Court case law is consistent with this categorization of judi-
cial power and with the notion of contingent constitutional requirements more specifically. It should be
noted, however, that the Court has not explicitly embraced the theory of contingent constitutional re-
quirements. Nor is the Court likely to do so any time soon.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 119-178.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 127-136.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 160-172.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 173-176.
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Congress exceeded its powers. 33 The committee reports for Section 3501 con-
centrate on the need for effective law enforcement, not solutions to the consti-
tutional problems identified by the Court. Other passages in the legislative
history deride the Supreme Court's Miranda decision and discuss the constitu-
tionality of the bill. The statute itself is silent on ways to mitigate the coercive-
ness of police interrogation and aid the courts with the difficult task of identi-
fying Fifth Amendment violations.
The organization of this Article mirrors that of the last three paragraphs.
Part I categorizes the power of the judiciary and legislature to define constitu-
tional rights and appropriate limits on state action. Particular care is taken to
define contingent constitutional requirements. Part II focuses on the Miranda
line of cases, showing that the Supreme Court identified contingent require-
ments of the Fifth Amendment and outlined the minimum procedural safe-
guards for satisfying those contingent requirements. Part III focuses on Section
3501, showing that its test for the admissibility of confessions fails to address
the contingent constitutional requirements described in Miranda. The unavoid-
able conclusion is that the Fourth Circuit in the Dickerson decision and the
scholarly critiques of Miranda are shortsighted.
By focusing on the prophylactic nature of the Miranda warnings, and by
describing the case as establishing mere evidentiary rules, critics and the
Fourth Circuit ignore the Court's central holding: that the judiciary was unable
to safeguard the Fifth Amendment or adjudicate Fifth Amendment claims un-
der the voluntariness standard, given the inherently coercive nature of custodial
interrogation and the limited effectiveness of investigating the "totality of the
circumstances". While the Fourth Circuit did not consider whether Section
3501 provides a solution for either of these concerns, the answer to this con-
stitutionally central question is that it does not. Congress lacks the power to
"overturn" Miranda and require less protection of a constitutional right than
the Court would provide.
I. CATEGORIZING THE JUDICIARY AND CONGRESS'S POWERS To DEFINE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND To REGULATE GOVERNMENT ACTION THAT
AFFECTS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
A. Defining Constitutional Rights and Actions that Directly Subvert Them
The judiciary has the ultimate power to interpret the Constitution.34 This
33. See infra text accompanying notes 179-202.
34. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (reaffirming that "the federal judiciary is supreme
in the exposition of the law of the Constitution" when Arkansas state officials declared they were not
bound by the Court's Brown v. Board of Education decision); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803).
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entails defining what the rights and powers granted in the Constitution mean
and determining whether particular acts are violative of or consistent with
those rights and powers. Chief Justice Marshall confidently asserted in 1803
that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is." 35 This statement from Marbury v. Madison appears in the
middle of a discussion affirming the supremacy of the Constitution over statu-
tory law, the invalidity of congressional acts "repugnant to the Constitution,"
and the inability of Congress to bind the Court to enforce laws the Court found
unconstitutional.36
What role this leaves for Congress in defining constitutional rights and
identifying violations of rights has become clearer in the last few years. The
Court's decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan seemed to leave open the possibility
that Congress could expand, but not limit, the scope of individual rights.
37
Morgan held that, using its enforcement power granted by Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress could prevent New York from requiring
English literacy as a condition of voting38-- despite that fact that the Supreme
Court had held in an earlier case that literacy requirements per se did not vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment. 39 For the majority, Justice Brennan wrote:
A construction of § 5 that would require a judicial determination that the enforce-
ment of the state law precluded by Congress violated the Amendment, as a condi-
tion of sustaining the congressional enactment, would depreciate both congressional
resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for implementing the Amendment.
It would confine the legislative power in this context to the insignificant role of ab-
rogating only those state laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge un-
constitutional, or of merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by particular-
izing the 'majestic generalities' of § 1 of the Amendment.
40
On the other hand, "§ 5 does not grant Congress power to exercise discre-
tion in the other direction and to enact 'statutes so as in effect to dilute equal
protection and due process decisions of this Court.... § 5 grants Congress no
power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees [of the Fourteenth
Amendment]. 41
The Supreme Court's recent decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,42 how-
ever, foreclosed a reading of Morgan that would allow Congress to alter the
Court's definition of constitutional rights by giving the rights a broader, more
35. SeeMarbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
36. See id. at 176-80.
37. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966).
38. See id. at 643. More specifically, § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provided that no one
with a sixth grade education in a Puerto Rican accredited school could be denied the right to vote on
account of an inability to read or write English.
39. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Election, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959).
40. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648-49.
41. Idat65ln.10.
42. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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expansive reading.43 The case involved a challenge to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), which Congress passed in an attempt to "legislatively
overrule" an earlier Supreme Court decision." In Employment Division, De-
partment of Human Resources v. Smith,45 the Supreme Court held that neutral,
generally applicable laws could substantially burden individuals' religious
practices without violating the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Through RFRA, Congress sought to impose a test for adjudicating Free Exer-
cise claims that would offer greater protection for religious practice: laws that
substantially burdened religious exercise would only be constitutional if they
were narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.46 The
Supreme Court struck down RFRA as an illegitimate exercise of Section 5's
47enforcement power.
City of Boerne made clear that Congress's Section 5 power extends only to
enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is to say, reme-
dying violations of the Amendment. The power does not extend to "decree[ing]
the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States," to
"changing what the right is," or to "determin[ing] what constitutes a constitu-
tional violation., 48 Giving Congress the power to define-or change the defi-
nition of-constitutional rights would reduce the Constitution to the level of
statutes and would leave congressional power unchecked.49
It must follow that Congress also lacks the power to eliminate remedies
that the Supreme Court deems inherent in, or essential for, constitutional
rights. 50 To do so would have the practical effect of changing the definition of
43. See id. at 527-28 ("There is language in our opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan... which could
be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights con-
tained in § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is not a necessary interpretation, however, or even the
best one.").
44. Seeid. at512-16.
45. 494 U.S. 872, 883-90 (1990).
46. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515-16.
47. See id. at 529-36. The Archbishop of San Antonio brought the suit, claiming that it violated
RFRA to deny a permit for the expansion of a Catholic church in Boeme on account of an historic
landmark ordinance.
48. Id. at 519.
49. See id. at 529.
50. For example, allowing protected speech is central to the First Amendment. Congress presuma-
bly could not allow a governmental body that had lost a prior restraints suit to continue the suppression
of the plaintiff's speech, no matter what alternative remedies are available. Similarly, excluding a de-
fendant's illegally obtained statements at trial may be required by the Fifth Amendment. Other reme-
dies, however, are not as closely tied to the right that they vindicate. Examples include private damages
actions in federal court for the violation of constitutional rights, see infra notes 115-118 and accompa-
nying text, and the exclusionary rule as a remedy for illegal searches, see United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 905-06 (1984) (rejecting the notion that the exclusionary rule is "a necessary corollary of the
Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (stating that the exclusionary
rule is "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally... rather
than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved").
After describing the judiciary's ability to infer remedies for constitutional violations, Walter Dellin-
ger writes that Congress has some power to alter Court-created remedies that are not integrally tied up
Vol. 18:261, 2000
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the right, and it would give Congress the power to gut constitutional protec-
tions by eliminating the means to vindicate them.51 In this limited sense,
Morgan's "one way ratchet" is descriptively accurate. Congress can identify
rights violations and, drawing on its wide-ranging powers to make policy, craft
creative remedies that lie beyond what the Court has mandated, but which ef-
fectively protect the right as understood by the Supreme Court.52 Congress
.cannot, however, restrict essential remedies made available by the Supreme
Court.53
To summarize, if the Supreme Court has not faced a case in which it drew
an outer limit on a right, Congress is free tentatively to draw the line where it
will, 54 and Congress can identify state action that violates a right as defined by
the Court. Congress can also create remedies for rights violations to supple-
ment remedies created by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's prescription of Miranda wamings, and Congress's
with the rights that they protect. See Walter E. Dellinger, OfRights and Remedies: The Constitution as a
Sword, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1532, 1545-49 (1972). Dellinger believes, however, that the Supreme Court
still has the ability to reject the congressional alterations. Dellinger suggests that the Court should defer
as long as Congress's alternative remedy is equally effective and the Court's remedy is no longer neces-
sary to effectuate the Constitutional guarantee. This section of the Article discusses only core defini-
tions of constitutional rights, and remedies that are essential to give effect to the right. Dellinger's sug-
gested formula for when the Court should defer to Congress proves helpful, however, in the next section
of the Article.
51. The City of Boerne decision is animated by the realization that remedies can change the sub-
stantive meaning of a constitutional right. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20 ("While the line be-
tween measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive
change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining
where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed."). The Court determined that the new "reme-
dies" created by RFRA crossed the line and expanded the substantive meaning of the First Amendment.
See id. at 532 ("RFRA cannot be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to have
any meaning. RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be
understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to
attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections."). The opposite scenario is equally plausible:
Congress could eliminate existing remedies with the effect of limiting the substantive meaning of a con-
stitutional right.
It can be extremely difficult to disentangle the definition of a right and the remedies available for a
violation-they are flip sides of a single coin. A theory that places ultimate authority over substantive
rules in the hands of the Supreme Court, and ultimate authority over remedies in the hands of Congress,
seems untenable and is avoided in this Article.
52. See id at 517-19, 536 (noting that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the analogous § 2 of
the Fifteenth Amendment give Congress a broad power to adopt legislation "appropriate" to deter or
remedy constitutional violations, and noting the example of congressional voting rights legislation that
suspended voting requirements deemed facially constitutional by the Court); Burt, supra note 4, at 113-
14 (concluding that Congress's Fourteenth Amendment § 5 powers are based on the legislature's ability
to draw lines, make choices, and effectuate remedies that courts are poorly situated to make).
53. City of Boerne acknowledges that "the line between measures that remedy or prevent uncon-
stitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to dis-
cem," but insists that "the distinction exists and must be observed." City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20.
The Court suggested that remedies or preventative measures congruent and proportional to the injury
they target would be an appropriate exercise of congressional power, while measures that sweep too
broadly would cross the line. See id. at 520, 530-32.
54. See id. at 535 ("When Congress acts within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not
just the right but the duty to make its own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitu-
tion.").
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ability to modify or reject the warnings, however, are not governed by Mar-
bury and City of Boerne. As the Court has clarified since the Miranda decision,
there is no constitutional right to Miranda warnings as such.55 The failure to
give Miranda warnings does not itself infringe a suspect's constitutional rights,
and it is conceivable that the Miranda exclusionary rule may benefit a defen-
dant who has suffered no constitutional harm at all-that is to say, whose con-
fession was voluntary despite the lack of warnings. 56 To understand the Court's
ability to prescribe prophylactic warnings, and Congress's power to modify or
reject them, we must look beyond the question of defining the scope of consti-
tutional rights.
B. Contingent Constitutional Requirements
Some government activities that do not inherently, or always, subvert con-
stitutional rights nonetheless have the practical effect in today's society of
impermissibly burdening the exercise or limiting the protection of rights. The
impermissible nature of the government action in such cases is contingent on
some mutable or temporary condition. Examples include limited court or ad-
ministrative competence or resources; power dynamics between authority fig-
ures and private citizens; and finally, social pressures, monetary costs, or other
barriers limiting the exercise of constitutional rights. As long as the conditions
exist that cause government actions to burden constitutional rights, the Consti-
tution requires that the activities be regulated. These are contingent constitu-
tional requirements.
Contingent constitutional requirements respond to social and institutional
realities. Outlining the contours of contingent constitutional requirements is
likely to be fuzzier and more complicated than defining the core scope of con-
stitutional rights as described in Part I.A of this Article. The same holds true
for remedies. The remedies for contingent constitutional violations are neces-
sarily pragmatic in nature,57 and they may have to be blunt instruments. Pro-
hibiting government activities on account of contingent constitutional concerns
may result in a degree of "overprotection"-preventing some state action that
55. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) ("The Court recognized that these proce-
dural safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to
insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected.").
56. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985) ("The Miranda exclusionary rule...
sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth
Amendment violation.... Thus, in the individual case, Miranda's preventive medicine provides a rem-
edy even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm."); see also New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654-55 (1984) (stating that whether defendant's statements were compelled is an
issue separate from the consequences of police failure to make available Miranda safeguards); Tucker,
417 U.S. at 44-45 (finding a voluntary confession in the absence of full Miranda procedural safe-
guards).
57. See Crocker, supra note 21, at 323 (quoting Kaplan, supra note 21, at 1029-30: "[T]he Consti-
tution demands something that works-presumably at a reasonable social cost. The content of the par-
ticular remedial or prophylactic rule is thus a pragmatic decision rather than a constitutional fiat.").
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does not directly violate a constitutional right. However, this protection is nec-
essary to ensure the vitality and integrity of constitutional rights.
There are at least two categories of government actions that implicate con-
tingent constitutional requirements. The first is action that is unsusceptible to
clear judicial scrutiny, so that a court is unable to determine with confidence
whether a rights violation has occurred. When the government is aggressive,
operating at the edge of what is permissible, especially when the constitutional
line is difficult to draw, the actions fall into this category. The second consists
of government actions that inhibit the exercise of rights. 58 This is particularly
problematic when the full benefit to society of the constitutional right depends
not only on limiting the government's power, but on private individuals mak-
ing vigorous use of the freedom guaranteed by the right. The next two sections
of the Article define these two categories more fully, explaining why they trig-
ger contingent constitutional requirements and providing examples from Su-
preme Court case law. A third section explains the possible sources of author-
ity allowing the Supreme Court to identify and remedy contingent
constitutional violations. A final section analyzes Congress's power to address
contingent constitutional requirements.
1. Ensuring the integrity of court decisions and the full protection of
constitutional rights: Making sure that courts do not "miss"
constitutional violations because of limited facyinding competence
It is extremely difficult for courts to gauge with confidence and precision
whether some government actions violate the Constitution. This difficulty per-
sists, for example, when constitutionality turns on the subjective motive of the
state actor.5 9 It also occurs when constitutionality turns on subtle, contextual
factors. Actions that the government engages in repeatedly, and that appear
nearly identical, can violate the Constitution in some cases and not in others.
60
58. Widespread constitutional violations may be a contingency that requires a forceful, overbroad
remedy. This Article, however, only focuses on the two categories of contingent constitutional require-
ments described in the text.
59. The Supreme Court has often tailored its jurisprudence to avoid having to determine the sub-
jective motivation of state actors, or to minimize the importance of subjective motives. Instead of delv-
ing into whether the legislature engaged in unconstitutional political gerrymandering in Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), the Court applied an ultra-strict "one person, one vote" requirement
(stricter than the margin of error in the census) to find that the districting violated the Equal Protection
Clause. See id. at 731-34. The Court has also de-emphasized the subjective prong of qualified immunity
analysis in § 1983 actions against public officials for constitutional violations. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 815-18 (1982).
60. Police searches and seizures provide the best example. Court evaluation of compliance with the
Fourth Amendment is extremely fact intensive, with seemingly similar cases producing different results.
See Audra A. Dial, Note, Ad Hoc Adjudication: People v. Champion, Another Confusing Element in the
Turmoil Following Minnesota v. Dickerson, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1003, 1021-28 (1998) (providing
examples of seemingly inconsistent holdings and odd line drawing in "plain feel" cases). The difficulty
of making such fact specific decisions with any consistency, and the awkward position in which fact
specific litigation places police officers as they try to carry out their jobs, may help explain the pressure
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The record of such government acts is likely to be ambiguous and indetermi-
nate. Courts can engage in comprehensive, case-by-case analysis and investi-
gation in such cases, but the results would be both uncertain and inconsistent.
This reflects the limits of the courts' factfinding competence.
All Supreme Court constitutional adjudication is sensitive to the limits of
judicial competence.61 When the judiciary's competence is strained and the
Court believes it can "trust" the other branches to protect constitutional rights,
the Court defers to the other branches.62 When the other branches cannot be
"trusted," the Supreme Court responds with tough tests, bright line rules, or
prophylactic measures.63 The Court's response in these situations indicates that
it is better to err on the safe side. Indeed, it may be a contingent constitutional
requirement to do so.
2. Realizing the full benefits of constitutional rights by ensuring that
citizens have the unfettered opportunity to exercise them
The benefits of some constitutional rights are only realized when they are
affirmatively exercised by citizens. It is not enough for the government to re-
frain from denying or limiting such rights. The government must, if not en-
courage the exercise of the rights, at least leave enough space for their exercise
to flourish. The Supreme Court prohibits government action which "chills" the
exercise of such rights, or which renders their subsequent exercise useless, be-
cause it undermines the values and normative vision of the Constitution.
The First Amendment provides the best example of Court action to stop the
government from inhibiting the exercise of constitutional rights.64 The free and
plentiful expression protected by the First Amendment serves a number of val-
ues: promoting knowledge and "truth," facilitating the exercise of representa-
tive democracy, and furthering personal autonomy and self-fulfillment. 65 The
Court has struck down onerous libel laws, overly vague and expansive state
to create and then broaden bright line rules in Fourth Amendment law. It also demonstrates the wisdom
of the Constitution's preference for warrants-a constitutionally required procedural safeguard. A sec-
ond example is the Voting Rights Act's requirement that all changes to voting practices and procedures
in covered jurisdictions receive pre-clearance from the Department of Justice or the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals. Ferreting out unconstitutional purposes and effects in seemingly innocuous changes in vot-
ing practices requires an evaluation of local government history, politics, and personalities that are diffi-
cult for a court to discern.
61. See Strauss, supra note 18, at 192 (noting that courts can and do consider both constitutional
values and courts' institutional limitations when fashioning rules).
62. See id. at 205-06 (giving examples of rational review applied to most economic and social leg-
islation under equal protection doctrine).
63. See id. at 200, 204 (giving examples of strict scrutiny for content-based speech restrictions and
suspect classifications in equal protection doctrine).
64. Strauss gives the First Amendment as another example of the Court crafting "overprotective"
rules due to the difficulty involved in discerning whether a constitutional violation has occurred because
so much turns on the motives of the state actors. See id. at 195-201.
65. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTIUTIuONAL LAW 1025-28 (13th ed.
1997).
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regulations, and prior restraints on speech (such as licensing or permitting sys-
tems) in part because these government actions would discourage speech.
For example, false statements of fact are not protected by the First
Amendment, 66 but the States can only sanction such statements about govern-
ment figures' official conduct if they are made with "actual malice." 67 What
animated the Court's decision in New York Times v. Sullivan was the need to
protect against the self-censorship that could result if libel damages were im-
posed for negligently made false statements. Thus, the Court found Alabama's
libel law unconstitutional because it failed to provide adequate "safeguards for
freedom of speech. 68 "[T]he pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who
would give voice to public criticism," wrote the Court, "is an atmosphere in
which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive."69 The Court frankly ac-
knowledged that it considered the case "against the background of a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. 7 °
Sullivan and subsequent cases limit the ability of government to regulate
one particular type of speech-false statements-for fear of chilling speech.
The same rationale lies behind the more general First Amendment doctrines of
overbreadth, vagueness, and prior restraints. 71 The overbreadth doctrine simply
holds that regulation of unprotected speech cannot sweep too broadly, pro-
scribing or punishing protected speech.72 The vagueness doctrine requires that
regulations provide sufficiently precise definitions of the proscribed conduct so
that people can determine what they are and are not allowed to do.73 The prior
restraints doctrine disfavors requirements that speech be approved by the gov-
ernment before it is communicated to the public. Licensing schemes are pre-
sumed to violate the Constitution, and they are permitted only if the govern-
ment observes specific procedural safeguards.
74
66. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (noting that "there is no constitutional value in
false statements of fact," and that "the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional pro-
tection"); Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (noting certain catego-
ries of speech, including libel, the prevention of which does not raise any constitutional problems).
67. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964). Actual malice is defined as either knowledge that a statement was false or that a state-
ment was made with reckless disregard for its veracity.
68. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264.
69. Id. at 278.
70. Id. at 270.
71. See Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988) (identifying self-
censorship by speakers to avoid licensing regimes as one risk associated with prior restraints); GUNTHER
& SULLIVAN, supra note 65, at 1327, 1337 (preventing the "chilling" of protected speech is one justifi-
cation for the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines).
72. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 65, at 1327.
73. See id. at 1337.
74. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-59 (1965) (noting the heavy presumption against
the constitutional validity of prior restraints, and requiring that licensing schemes place the burden on
the state to prove that the speech is unprotected, process applications within a specified and brief period
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First Amendment doctrine has a lot in common with Miranda. In both
cases, the Supreme Court restricts government action to ensure that the gov-
ernment does not inhibit the exercise of constitutional rights. In both cases, the
Court creates an overbroad, irrebuttable presumption that if specific procedural
requirements are not satisfied, the government action is unconstitutional. And
in practice, both provide defenses for people whose acts do not warrant con-
stitutional protection.
3. Supreme Court authority to identify and remedy contingent
constitutional violations
There are a number of possible explanations for the Supreme Court's
power to define contingent constitutional requirements and ensure that they are
satisfied. The most comprehensive and satisfying is that identifying and reme-
dying contingent violations is simply a matter of traditional judicial review.
Alternative explanations are that Article III of the Constitution includes an im-
plied Necessary and Proper Clause for the judiciary, or that any issues closely
related to constitutional adjudication pose federal questions that the Court can
resolve.
Once the constitutional basis of contingent violations is appreciated, identi-
fying and remedying violations are properly seen as straightforward matters of
judicial review and constitutional interpretation as in Marbury. In some deci-
sions that create prophylactic procedural rules or require "breathing space" for
constitutional rights, the Court states that it is correcting or preventing viola-
tions of constitutional rights. Admittedly, in other cases the Court claims to be
creating rules that are not actually required by the Constitution. 75 The'discrep-
ancy appears to be a matter of semantics.76 The effects are the same, no matter
how the Court couches its reasoning. In both scenarios the Court creates a firm
rule that may benefit people whose rights have not been invaded, and the Court
does so either to avoid chilling the exercise of a right or to make sure that
courts do not under-protect rights when resolving cases.
A more sophisticated version of the "judicial review" basis for Court
authority is that some constitutional amendments have an implicit enforcement
clause. 77 According to this theory, amendments creating rights are also in-
tended to secure their vitality; the amendments have "built in protections" to
of time, and provide for prompt judicial review).
75. Compare, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), with Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) (illustrating the Court's varying rationales for its holdings).
76. See Strauss, supra note 18, at 196.
77. See generally Crocker, supra note 21. Crocker is trying to find authority for the exclusionary
rule, and concludes that some constitutional rights have an implicit enforcement clause. This, he argues,
allows the Court to craft rules deterring future violations. While deterring future violations and pre-
venting a "chilling" of rights are distinct objectives, they are analogous in this sense: Both are intended
to preserve the fortitude of constitutional rights.
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ensure that the rights do not become a "mere form of words. 78 Drawing on
these implicit protections, the Court can, as a matter of judicial review and
constitutional interpretation, make sure that people have every opportunity-
and no governmentally imposed disincentives-to exercise their rights.79 Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court could adopt the procedural rules necessary to ensure
its effective vindication of rights when deciding cases. The Supreme Court
seemingly embraces an enforcement power in Miranda itself, justifying its de-
cision on the ground that "[a]s courts have been presented with the need to en-
force constitutional rights, they have found means of doing so."
80
If one thinks that addressing contingent constitutional requirements is
somehow distinct from remedying core constitutional rights claims, then it may
be necessary to look beyond judicial review for a source of Court power. One
possibility is federal question jurisdiction.8 1 This theory holds that any question
with a significant relationship to a constitutional right is a federal question,
which the federal judiciary can resolve.8 2 Grano uses the burden of proof re-
quired to show a constitutional violation and the standards for waiving consti-
tutional rights as examples.83 Another example might be the elaboration in
Chapman of a federal standard for harmless constitutional error applicable to
the states.
8 4
Another potential source of authority for the courts to address contingent
constitutional requirements is a "necessary and proper" power for the judiciary,
78. Crocker, supra note 21, at 316, 327.
79. Similarly, the power to prevent constitutional rights from becoming "mere forms of words"
allows the Court to create remedies for constitutional violations-including offensive remedies, such as
a cause of action. See Dellinger, supra note 50, at 1532-45. The power to create a constitutional cause of
action is limited to when a right has been violated. But like rules that deter rights violations or rules that
leave space for the exercise of rights, inferring a cause of action looks beyond the case at hand to protect
the vitality of constitutional rights.
80. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490. The Court in Miranda saw itself as continuing the task, begun in
Escobedo v. State oflllinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), of ensuring that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination "not become but a 'form of words' .. .in the hands of government officials."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (citation omitted). Worried about the inherent compulsion of police interro-
gation, the goal of the procedural safeguards that the Court put in place was to ensure that suspects re-
main free at all times to decide for themselves whether to make a statement or to invoke their Fifth
Amendment Privilege. See id at 444, 457-58.
81. See Grano, supra note 8, at 147-53.
82. Normally, court resolution of federal questions can be altered by Congress in any way it
pleases. See id. at 148 ("Because this argument finds it unnecessary to assume that these issues have
constitutional answers, Congress presumably would retain authority to modify the answers that courts
provide."). At certain points, however, Grano suggests that resolving issues collateral to constitutional
adjudication may be different than resolving issues related to statutes. See id at 152-53 ("It is not
clear.., that the Court would abdicate in the face of a legislative override of the rules in these cases.
The point, however, is that even if some of these rules are not viewed as constitutionally required, their
promulgation by federal courts as a matter of federal law does not seem particularly troubling.").
83. See id at 147.
84. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-23 (1967) (concluding that fashioning an appropri-
ate harmless error standard for constitutional violations posed a federal question, and, after reviewing
California's standard, determining that "[w]e prefer the approach of this Court in deciding what was
harmless error").
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implied from Article III of the Constitution.85 This power could allow the judi-
ciary to adopt whatever rules and procedures are "necessary or proper" for de-
ciding cases in a sound manner. More broadly, it could allow the judiciary to
craft rules "necessary and proper" to protect the viability of constitutional
rights.
The implied power has its roots in the venerable case of McCulloch v.
Maryland.86 That decision, upholding the constitutionality of the national bank,
is based largely on an acceptance of implied powers within the Constitution.
8 7
The Court noted that in contrast to the Articles of Confederation, "there is no
phrase in [the Constitution] which.., excludes incidental or implied powers;
and which requires that everything granted shall be expressly and minutely de-
scribed."88 The Court went on to explain that implied powers are essential if
the government is to exercise the powers explicitly granted in the Constitution.
The Court concluded its discussion of implied powers assertively: "The gov-
ernment which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty of per-
forming that act, must according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select
the means."
8 9
Skeptics point out that the McCulloch case was about Congress's powers,
not the courts'. 90 This distinction is meaningful both because it calls into ques-
tion the significance of the precedent for understanding the judiciary's power,
and because there is a textual basis for finding implied legislative powers in the
Constitution. That basis is the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I Section
8, and there is no analogue for the judiciary in Article III.
These critiques, however, are not convincing. Marshall did not locate the
implied powers in the Necessary and Proper Clause.9 1 Furthermore, the
McCulloch language concerning implied powers speaks generally about the
"government," not about any particular branch. Because Article III does not
define the judicial power (in sharp contrast to Art. I Section 8 and Art. II), the
power must extend beyond the limits of the constitutional text.92 Finally,
85. Joseph Grano developed this understanding of the judiciary's power, and it is implicit in Law-
rence Crocker's theory of contingent constitutional requirements. See Crocker, supra note 21, at 313
(concluding that the Court may be able to craft overbroad rules as part of its judicial review authority as
long as there is no effectively administrable narrower rule possible); Grano, supra note 8, at 137-45.
86. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
87. See Grano, supra note 8, at 139.
88. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 406.
89. Id. at 409.
90. See Grano, supra note 8, at 137-39; William Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determin-
ing Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect
of the Sweeping Clause, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Spring 1976, at 102, 122-27 (arguing that the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause plays an important role in making Congress "first among equals" in relation to
the Executive and Judiciary branches, and that the Clause lodges the power to define any additional
authority of the executive and the judiciary in Congress alone).
91. See Grano, supra note 8, at 139.
92. See id. at 139 (noting that, in fact, creating remedies and rules of procedure may be part of the
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McCulloch's language about government with the duty to act speaks most
powerfully to the judiciary and the executive. Congress is under no obligation
to legislate. The courts, on the other hand, are given jurisdiction, and cases and
controversies are brought to them. With very limited exceptions, lower courts
do not have the discretion to refrain from deciding cases properly before
them.93 Consistent with McCulloch, it seems essential that a branch of govern-
ment have the flexibility to fulfill its obligations effectively.
In cases earlier this century, the Supreme Court expanded its power to cre-
ate rules that would promote the search for truth and aid the efficiency of the
judiciary. 94 Warren Court cases also seem to draw on an implied power of the
judiciary to create rules that aid the effectiveness and integrity of its work. In
Chapman v. State of California,95 the Supreme Court imposed a uniform con-
stitutional harmless error rule on the states. The Court never addressed the
question of whether the California harmless error rule at issue in the case was
unconstitutional. Instead, the Court simply decided that it "preferred" its own
more demanding rule, which was less likely to allow constitutional errors to
taint criminal proceedings than more permissive state rules. 96 Another example
is the prophylactic rule in North Carolina v. Pearce to avoid vindictive sen-
tencing.
97
Of course, recognizing an implied power within Article III only begs the
question: how far does the power extend? The power is to make rules that help
the accuracy, integrity, and smooth handling of cases and constitutional inter-
pretation. Grano argues that the courts can only use the implied power to make
procedural rules.98 After all, substantive rules-rules required by the Constitu-
tion-are based on the Court's power to decide cases and interpret the Consti-
core judicial power, without needing to draw on any implied power).
93. See County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188 (1959) ("The doctrine of
abstention, under which a district court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdic-
tion, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a district court to adjudicate a controversy
properly before it."); Cohen v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (holding that the federal
judiciary has "no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution").
94. See Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (holding that federal courts can
stay proceedings until the Supreme Court settles a point of law important to the case, because "the
power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of
the cases on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants" in
mind); Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381-82 (1933) (holding that, even absent congressional ac-
tion, federal courts have power to alter common law rules of evidence).
95. 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967).
96. Seeid. at21,23.
97. 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969). Pearce held that after a defendant successfully appeals his convic-
tion and obtains a retrial, a sentence greater than that imposed in the original trial will be overturned
unless the trial judge (1) explains the longer sentence and (2) bases the sentence on objective informa-
tion about the defendant's conduct that occurs after the original sentence was imposed. Unless those
conditions are satisfied, the court of appeals will presume that retaliation motivated the more onerous
sentence. See id. at 725.
98. See Grano, supra note 8, at 141, 144.
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tution.99 Grano further distinguishes between rebuttable presumptions, which
are appropriate exercises of the implied power, and conclusive (or irrebuttable)
presumptions, which Grano believes exceed the power because they "make ir-
relevant the constitutional issues federal courts are charged to decide." ' How-
ever, the distinction between rebuttable and conclusive presumptions is one of
degree, not kind. l0 ' A bright line, conclusive presumption may serve the justi-
fications for exercising the implied power-promoting accuracy, integrity, and
administrability-better than a procedure that requires detailed, subjective fact-
finding.
10 2
Lawrence Crocker suggests a limit on the courts' judicial review authority
that could apply to the implied power in Article III as well. According to
Grano, rules adopted pursuant to the judicial review authority may be legiti-
mate only to the extent that no narrower effectively administrable rule is possi-
ble. 10 3 While logically sound, in practice it may be difficult to determine
whether a rule is as narrow as practicably possible. Walter Dellinger proposes
that the Court's implied power to create remedies for constitutional violations
should permit not only remedies that are indispensable, but remedies that are
merely helpful or appropriate for protecting the vitality of constitutional
rights. 1° 4 It would not be much of a leap to adopt this standard for the Court's
implied power to recognize and remedy contingent constitutional violations. 
10
4. Congress and Contingent Constitutional Requirements
Given the Supreme Court's power to act on contingent constitutional re-
quirements, the question remains: What power does Congress have to respond
to a perceived contingent constitutional requirement independently, to replace
99. See id. at 144.
100. Id. at 147. Grano's thinking runs as follows: Rules created pursuant to the implied power pur-
port to not be interpretations of the Constitution. Because irrebuttable procedural rules are dispositive,
they preclude courts from reaching constitutional issues that may be lurking in a case.
101. David Strauss gives as hypotheticals alternative rebuttable presumptions that the Court could
have adopted in Miranda. See Strauss, supra note 18, at 191-92. One possibility is a presumption that
confessions obtained in violation of Miranda will be excluded unless the prosecution can produce evi-
dence "so strong as effectively to eliminate all doubt whatever that the statement was voluntary." Id. at
192. This meets Grano's requirement that presumptions be rebuttable, but it would not lead to different
results than the existing Miranda exclusionary rule. The example also demonstrates that the rebutta-
ble/conclusive distinction is baseless line drawing.
102. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 435, 450 (1987)
("When an assessment is complex and often beyond the ken of judges or when proof of the circum-
stances crucial to a fact-bound judgment is largely within the control of one party ... a conclusive pre-
sumption may be the best way, over the run of cases, to minimize adjudicatory error."); Strauss, supra
note 18, at 190-95. If certain types of evidence are so powerful that they will always determine the out-
come of a balancing test, no matter how it is phrased, then a conclusive presumption saves judicial re-
sources and eliminates the chance that a lower court could "get it wrong."
103. See Crocker, supra note 21, at 313.
104. See Dellinger, supra note 50, at 1549-50.
105. Dellinger's standard seems like the most reasonable limit on the implied Article III power. In
the end, however, this is not an issue that can be adequately explored in the context of this Article.
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judicial rules with its own policy solutions for contingent constitutional re-
quirements, or to reject a court crafted rule (in effect "overturning" the judicial
decision)? The best answer is that Congress can substitute its own judicial rule
for the Court's, but it must be responsive to the constitutional concerns identi-
fied by the Court.
Clearly, Congress is free to act without judicial prompting. The generous
reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland,10 6 cou-
pled with Congress's enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment,1
0 7
gives it wide latitude to protect and vindicate constitutional rights. The trickier
question is what latitude Congress enjoys when the Court has identified a con-
tingent constitutional requirement and created a judicial rule in response. Rob-
ert Burt suggests that Congress's power in such a situation is limited to en-
forcing the Court's "value preferences, under the Fourteenth Amendment"
rather than imposing its own.' Congress can act to address contingent con-
stitutional concerns identified by the Court more effectively, but it cannot re-
ject the Court's constitutional concerns. 1' 9
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is not the only source of congres-
sional power, however. Congress has regulatory authority over the federal
courts, including the power to make rules of evidence and procedure."10 This
authority is implicit in its power to establish inferior federal courts, and it also
derives from Congress's power to make whatever laws are necessary and
proper for the execution of all the powers vested in the federal government. 111
Scholars who have accepted the notion of contingent constitutional re-
quirements assume that Congress's power to make rules of evidence and pro-
106. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
107. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966).
108. Burt, supra note 4, at 114. Or, put another way, "the Court will set the basic terms. Congress
can only fill in the blanks." Id. at 118. Burt bases his rather circumscribed view of Congress's § 5
power on the fact that "[t]he Court clearly retains its option to pass on any § 5 legislation that touches on
'fundamental'-though not, as such, constitutional-rights. By this standard there is no exercise of 'in-
dependent' congressional authority under § 5 that is independent of the Court's final arbitration." Id. at
117. Burt in this passage is, in effect, talking about contingent constitutional requirements.
109. See id. at 121 (noting that the Court would approve of "reforms" that "reshaped Court doctrine
to make it responsive to conflicting interests in a manner that the Court itself might not comfortably be
able to reach," but would approve of, while rejecting "restrictions" on Court doctrine). Burt's article
focuses on the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Morgan decision, but the author also writes
that Miranda's invitation to Congress and the states to come up with alternative policy solutions is the
same as the invitation for Congress to act under its § 5 powers expressed in Morgan. See id. at 127. Burt
concludes that unless the Court overrules its own restriction on congressional action expressed in foot-
note ten of the Morgan decision (which the Court has not done), then § 3501 is unconstitutional. See id
at 123-34.
110. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265 (1982) (noting "the traditional powers of Congress
to prescribe rules of evidence and standards of proof in the federal courts" based on its Article I, § 8
power to create inferior federal courts); Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 345-48 (1959) (de-
scribing an example of Congress legislating rules of criminal procedure to supplant a Supreme Court
decision).
111. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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cedure extends to this arena, even to the point of superceding rules created by
the Supreme Court. 112 There is one significant caveat, however. Congress's
rules must be as effective and efficient, or more so, than the Court's rules."13
The line of cases creating and defining a cause of action for money dam-
ages for constitutional violations supportg this understanding of the relative
powers of Congress and the courts in terms of contingent constitutional re-
quirements. Recognizing that citizens had to have some way to remedy con-
stitutional violations, the Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics'1 4 determined that allowing private actions was
appropriate. But, a private damages action is not a necessary remedy, indispen-
sable for vindicating any particular constitutional right.115 The Supreme Court
has acknowledged that Bivens actions would not be permitted if Congress were
to establish a scheme both intended to substitute for a civil damages action and
equally effective in remedying rights violations. 16 Such a situation arose in
Bush v. Lucas.117 The Court refused to allow a Bivens action by a federal em-
ployee demoted for criticizing the agency for which he worked. Congress had
created an elaborate administrative appeal system for employees, and because
the administrative system provided meaningful remedies, it provided an ade-
quate replacement for court actions by employees."'
II. MIRANDA AS A LEGITIMATE RESPONSE TO CONTINGENT CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS
Miranda does not define the scope of Fifth Amendment rights directly."19
112. See Crocker, supra note 21, at 331 (writing about Congress's ability to replace judicial meas-
ures, such as the exclusionary rule, to deter Fourth Amendment violations); Dellinger, supra note 50, at
1545-49 (writing about Congress's ability to replace court-created remedies for constitutional viola-
tions).
113. See Crocker, supra note 21, at 331; Dellinger, supra note 50, at 1548-49 (concluding that the
Court should defer to Congress when (1) the alternative remedy is considered by Congress to be equally
effective, and (2) in light of Congress's remedy, the Court's remedy is no longer necessary to effectuate
the constitutional guarantee). Most of the academic literature focuses on Congress's exercise of its § 5
power. There is no reason to think, however, that Congress would have more authority to subvert con-
stitutional rights using a different power, just because that power seems, at first blush, to be far removed
from the arena of individual rights.
114. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
115. See Craig Goldblatt, Note, Harmless Error as Constitutional Common Law: Congress' Power
To Reverse Arizona v. Fulminante, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 985, 1008 (1993). Walter Dellinger believes that
the Court's power extends to creating appropriate or helpful remedies for constitutional violations, not
just remedies that are indispensable. See Dellinger, supra note 50, at 1549-50.
116. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980).
117. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
118. Seeid at386.
119. Prof. Schulhofer concludes that the Miranda decision did in fact define the scope of Fifth
Amendment rights (namely, that informal compulsion in custodial interrogations violates the Fifth
Amendment), which differ from the Due Process right (which requires only that confessions be given
voluntarily). See Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 435-45. If true, then the consternation about the fact that
un-Mirandized confessions can still be voluntary misses the point. It is possible to find the Fifth
Amendment and Due Process tests described distinctly in the case law. See Withrow v. Williams, 507
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The Supreme Court has acknowledged that failure to administer Miranda
warnings, in some circumstances, might not violate the Fifth Amendment.
120
Miranda's safeguards are "not themselves rights protected by the Constitu-
tion," 121 and some Justices have gone so far as to say that the Miranda exclu-
sionary rule is not constitutionally required. 122 The question, therefore, is
whether Miranda warnings or their equivalents are contingent requirements of
the Fifth Amendment, or whether the decision is an example of illegitimate
policy making by the Court.
The Court answered this question in the Miranda decision, declaring that
"the issues presented are of constitutional dimensions . ,123 The concerns
that animated the Court in Miranda, the Court's reasoning, and cases following
Miranda confirm that the requirement of adequate warnings before interroga-
tion fit both justifications for contingent constitutional requirements identified
earlier in this Article: ensuring the integrity of court factfinding related to con-
stitutional claims and ensuring that there are ample opportunities for exercising
constitutional rights.
A. Ensuring the Integrity of Courts' Voluntariness Determinations
The landmark case Brown v. Mississippi124 marked the start of a line of
Due Process cases testing the admissibility of confessions by asking if they
were given voluntarily. The Court settled on a "totality of the circumstances"
analysis for determining the voluntariness of confessions.' 25 Courts would
weigh all the facts relating to the personal characteristics and background of
the defendant and the police conduct during questioning to judge whether the
defendant had given a confession freely, or whether the police had "overborne"
the defendant's "will.'
126
It has proven difficult, however, to determine the voluntariness of confes-
U.S. 680, 688-90 (1993). However, the post-Miranda cases do not carefully disaggregate the two rights
or indicate which right they rely on, and other scholars see the tests for Fifth Amendment compulsion
and Due Process voluntariness as identical. See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE
LAW 136-37 (1993); Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor
Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 174, 182-86 (1988); Charles Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL
L. REv. 109, 114 & n.20 (1998).
120. See Miranda, 384 U.S. 436,457 (1966).
121. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
122. See Withrow, 507 U.S. at 702 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
123. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490.
124. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
125. In the cases following Brown, the Court vacillated between an older voluntariness test which
focused on the reliability of confessions, and the due process approach, which looked at the circum-
stances of the interrogation. In time, the Court consolidated these two approaches. See Charles J.
Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal To Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L.
REv. 1826, 1833 (1987).
126. See Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621,
624-25 (1996); Weisselberg, supra note 119, at 113-14.
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sions with any confidence or consistency. 127 Miranda's bright line rule com-
pensates for the inadequacies of the voluntariness test, giving courts an easily
administrable test, making the analysis of interrogations consistent, and elimi-
nating the dangers of under-enforcement of the Fifth Amendment privilege re-
sulting from subtle forms 6f compulsion in interrogations.
The shortcomings of the voluntariness test were evident before the
Miranda decision. Because the "totality of the circumstances" test was so
flexible, value-laden, and fact specific, trial courts had no clear standards to go
by, and appellate courts faced the burden of case by case review. 28 As atten-
tion shifted from brute physical coercion to subtler, psychological interrogation
tactics, the task of weighing voluntariness became even more difficult. 129 Fur-
ther complicating matters was the fact that the Supreme Court's Due Process
doctrine for confessions was complicated and inconsistent. Shifting definitions
of coercion, varied theories of what Due Process was meant to protect in the
area of confessions, and numerous tests and rules all played a role in the
Court's jurisprudence.
130
Passages in the Miranda decision reflect the realization that the "totality of
the circumstances" test was inadequate both in terms of protecting the Fifth
Amendment privilege generally and in terms of accurately gauging the degree
of coercion in particular cases. The Court frankly acknowledged that "[p]rivacy
results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what
in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms.' 131 The Court also noted that as-
sessments of a defendant's understanding of his rights "can never be more than
speculation," even if courts consider a myriad of factors such as age, education,
intelligence, and prior experience with the police.
132
Cases following Miranda reiterate that clarity is one of the major benefits
of the decision's bright line exclusionary rule. 133 In Fare v. Michael, for exam-
ple, the Court wrote that Miranda's "relatively rigid requirement that interro-
gation must cease upon the accused's request for an attorney ... has the virtue
127. See LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 4, at 299 (noting that the totality of the circumstances
standard "impaired the effectiveness and legitimacy ofjudicial review" by failing to provide judges with
adequate guidance, allowing judges to give weight to their own biases, and relying on unverifiable tes-
timony. LaFave and Israel conclude that Miranda was a response to these circumstances. See id).
128. See Ogletree, supra note 125, at 1833-37; Schulhofer, supra note 102, at 451; Weisselberg,
supra note 119, at 113-15. Ogietree gives examples from the early 1960s of lower courts failing to ex-
clude confessions extracted through obviously abusive tactics. See Ogletree, supra note 125, at 1835.
129. See Weisselberg, supra note 119, at 115.
130. See Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REv. 2195, 2197-2203,
2236-37 (1996).
131. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448.
132. See id. at 468-69.
133. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., delivering the opinion of
the court), 663-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 679 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (acknowledging in each opinion that creating a public safety exception to Miranda's exclusionary
rule lessens its "desirable clarity," and pointing out that the Court has been careful to preserve the clarity
in cases following Miranda).
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of... informing courts under what circumstances statements obtained dur-
ing..., interrogation are not admissible."' 34 A recent case reaffirming the con-
stitutional basis of Miranda offers a distinct but similar justification for its ex-
clusionary rule, suggesting that it protects against the use of unreliable
statements at trial. 135 Indeed, courts continue to apply the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test for voluntariness with great confusion.'
36
Of course, the Court has not completely rejected the voluntariness test, and
still uses it to determine Fifth Amendment violations when Miranda does not
apply.' 37 The Court has limited the application of the "fruit of the tainted tree"
doctrine in the Miranda context, allowing prosecutors to use evidence procured
as a result of confessions obtained in violation of Miranda.138 The Court has
also allowed the use of confessions obtained in violation of Miranda to im-
peach witnesses.' 39 Finally, the Court has recognized a public safety exception
to Miranda's requirements. 40 To admit a confession taken without Miranda
protections at trial, either to impeach a defendant or under the public safety ex-
134. Fare v. Michael, 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979) (refusing to take a broad, flexible view of Miranda
in holding that asking to see a probation officer is not a per se invocation of suspect's Fifth Amendment
rights).
135. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993). Withrow held that state prisoners could
bring federal habeas claims that their convictions rested on statements obtained in violation of Miranda,
even if the prisoners had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their Miranda claims in state proceedings.
Id. at 683. The Withrow majority purported to accept "petitioner's premise for the purpose of this case"
that Miranda's safeguards are not constitutional in character, but merely 'prophylactic....' Withrow,
507 U.S. at 690. The Court concluded that federal courts must remain open to Miranda habeas claims,
however, because "in protecting a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
Miranda safeguards 'a fundamental trial right."' Id. at 691. The decision also raises the question, if
Miranda's exclusionary rule is not constitutional, how can the Supreme Court enforce it against the
states?
136. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Depriva-
tions of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 429, 472 tbl.B1 (1998) (reporting study of false confessions in which 48% of the false
confessions resulted in convictions, showing that with the current doctrines, judges often fail to exclude
unreliable evidence); Paul Marcus, A Return to the "Bright Line Rule" of Miranda, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 93, 101, 109 (1993); Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39
VAND. L. REv. 1, 12 (1986) ("Even in quite recent times, lower courts have ruled confessions admissi-
ble under the voluntariness standard despite the presence of factors that seem to be extraordinarily coer-
cive.").
Some Justices, however, continue to express faith in the efficacy of the voluntariness test. See
Withrow, 507 U.S. at 703-04 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("To the extent
Miranda ensures the exclusion of involuntary statements, that task can be performed more accurately by
adjudicating the voluntariness question directly.".); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1974) (allowing
the use of statements made in violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes and asserting that police
abuse could "be taken care of when it arises measured by the traditional standards for evaluating volun-
tariness and trustworthiness").
137. See Marcus, supra note 136, at 101 (noting that the voluntariness test is still used, although
only in extreme cases).
138. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (holding that initial Miranda violation does
not require exclusion of second statement obtained from defendant after he was properly warned);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 451-52 (1974) (holding admissible the testimony of witness discov-
ered through questioning of defendant without full Miranda warnings).
139. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
140. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984).
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ception, prosecutors must still show that the confession was given voluntarily
using the "totality of the circumstances" test.141 The Court's general unwilling-
ness to extend the application of Miranda reflects the fact that some of the cur-
rent Justices believe that the "totality of the circumstances" test is an adminis-
trable, effective test for assessing Fifth Amendment violations. 1
42
The Court's willingness to use the voluntariness test at times calls into
question the argument that Miranda's prophylactic requirements are essential
to ensure the integrity of courts' assessment of compulsion and coercion in in-
terrogations, but it is not dispositive for two reasons. First, the Court's en-
dorsement of the voluntariness test should not be overstated. The Court did not
directly face the adequacy of the voluntariness test in any of the cases limiting
Miranda's exclusionary rule, because none of the defendants claimed that their
confessions were involuntary.
143
Second, it makes sense that the remedies available for violating contingent
constitutional requirements might be more limited, or at least different, than the
remedies available for a violation of core constitutional rights. The Supreme
Court has the power to infer remedies for constitutional rights violations, but
few are conclusively required by the import of the constitutional text. The Fifth
Amendment may in fact demand the exclusion of a defendant's compelled con-
fession from the prosecution's case in chief. But in general, determining what
remedies to make available is a flexible and creative task driven by a searching
analysis of the values promoted by a constitutional right and the character of
the government actions that may impinge that right.
Limiting Miranda to allow the use of confessions for impeachment pur-
poses illustrates this point. The Court's stated reason for the impeachment ex-
ception in Harris emphasizes Miranda's goal of deterring police misconduct,
concluding that exclusion of confessions from the case in chief has a sufficient
deterrent effect. 144 The Court also points out that impeachment serves as a nec-
essary check on perjury. 145 It could also be argued that impeaching a defendant
141. See id at 655 n.5; Hass, 420 U.S. at 722-24.
142. See supra note 136. O'Connor writes:
[t]he totality of the circumstances approach... permits each fact to be taken into account with-
out resort to formal and dispositive labels. By dispensing with the difficulty of producing a
yes-or-no answer to questions that are often better answered in shades and degrees, the vol-
untariness inquiry often can make judicial decisionmaking easier rather than more onerous.
Withrow, 507 U.S. at 711-12; see also Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It Ir-
relevant? 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461, 477 (1998) (noting that decisions after Miranda have touted the
virtues of the voluntariness test).
143. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654; Hass, 420 U.S. at 722; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 437-39 (describing
the claim as asserting only a violation of the Miranda prophylactic rule, but proceeding to evaluate
whether the defendant's statements were voluntary anyway) Harris, 401 U.S. at 224; Garcia, supra note
142, at 483, 490-93 (discussing Quarles); Weisselberg, supra note 119, at 127 (discussing impeachment
cases).
144. See Harris, 401 U.S. at 225.
145. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 645-46.
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with his confession does not significantly implicate Fifth Amendment interests;
the defendant's prior statements are not offered to prove any element of a
crime, but merely to raise doubts about credibility, and the choice of whether to
testify and what to testify about remain in the defendant's hands.146 The Su-
preme Court has refused to allow the use of evidence obtained unconstitution-
ally from the defendant to impeach other witnesses, because it would "frustrate
rather than further the purposes underlying the exclusionary rule."' 47 In such a
case, Fifth Amendment interests are implicated, because if the defendant wants
to mount a defense with witnesses, his previous words could be used against
him.148 Allowing such a sweeping use of the defendant's statements would also
weaken the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on police.'
49
The public safety exception to Miranda does not limit the remedies avail-
able for the violation of a contingent constitutional requirement, but instead
limits the scope of the contingent requirement itself. The Supreme Court held
in New York v. Quarles that police do not have to give a suspect Miranda
warnings before asking "questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the
public safety.' 50 The facts of the case do not seriously implicate Miranda's
constitutional concerns. 151 In Quarles, police officers chased down a rape sus-
pect in a grocery store. The suspect reportedly had a gun, but he was empty-
handed when the police cornered him. The police asked the defendant where
the gun was after they handcuffed him, and he told them where he had hidden
it. The public safety exception to Miranda is not broad. It only applies when
there is some "exigency requiring immediate action by the officers [to protect
the police or public] beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a serious
crime."' 52 The Quarles Court emphasized the "kaleidoscopic" nature of the
situation, "where spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is nec-
146. If the defendant is credible, the difference between his story when confessing and when testi-
fying could aid the court in determining whether the confession was compelled using the totality of the
circumstances voluntariness test. The change in the defendant's story could be evidence of overbearing
coercion that either forced the defendant to say something (anything!) or that frightened and confused
the defendant to the point that he could not remember or relate facts accurately. If this is the case, en-
forcing the Miranda's exclusionary rule is not as necessary as usual for ensuring the integrity of the
courts' Fifth Amendment adjudication.
147. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 314 (1990). The constitutional defect in the case was actually
a Fourth Amendment violation, a warrantless search without probable cause, but the evidence in ques-
tion was a statement by the defendant following the search. The Court drew substantially on the
Miranda line of cases in the decision.
148. See id. at 314-16. The Court was worried that impeachment of other witnesses could "chill
some defendants from presenting their best defense." Id. Defendants have much less control over the
content of other witness's testimony than over their own testimony. A defendant's ability to respond to
the impeachment of witnesses is also limited, unless the defendant takes the stand.
149. See id at 317-18.
150. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656.
151. Seeid.at651-52.
152. Id. at 659 n.8 (distinguishing another case, Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), in which
un-Mirandized questioning about the location of a gun was "clearly investigatory").
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essarily the order of the day."'
53
Two factors unique to the circumstances of a Quarles type situation under-
cut the need to err on the safe side when evaluating whether the custodial inter-
rogation was overly coercive. First, when the officer's questions are "reasona-
bly prompted by a concern for the public safety,"' 54 there is no risk of an
untoward government motive or a cynical strategic approach to overbearing
interrogation. Second, the questioning is likely to take place in public, as it did
in Quarles. The Miranda opinion emphasized the closed-off station house en-
vironment of most custodial interrogations, both because it adds to the coercive
atmosphere, and because it limits a court's ability to determine what actually
happened during an interrogation. 55 While Miranda requirements generally
apply outside of the station house, interrogation in a public place mitigates
concerns about a court's ability to evaluate the voluntariness of a confession.
In other decisions, the Court has rejected an overly technical, formal appli-
cation of Miranda when defining "in custody" and "custodial interrogation,"
asking instead whether the "concerns that powered the decision are impli-
cated."'156 In Illinois v. Perkins, for example, the Court held that Miranda
warnings are not required when an undercover agent impersonating a prisoner
speaks with a suspect in jail. 5 7 Even though the suspect was technically in
custody and speaking with a government agent, "the essential ingredients of a
'police-dominated atmosphere' and compulsion are not present when an incar-
cerated person speaks freely to someone whom he believes to be a fellow in-
mate."'' 5 8 Therefore, the conversation with the undercover agent did not "im-
plicate the concerns underlying Miranda."'59
B. Ensuring a Meaningful Ability to Exercise the Fifth Amendment Privilege
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination reinforces a
153. Id. at 656. Later in the decision, the Court wrote,
We decline to place officers... in the untenable position of having to consider, often in a
matter of seconds, whether it best serves society for them to ask the necessary questions with-
out the Miranda warnings and render whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible,
or for them to give the warnings in order to preserve the admissibility of evidence they might
uncover but possibly damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the
volatile situation confronting them.
Id. at 657-58.
154. Id. at 656.
155. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445, 448, 449-50, 455 (1966).
156. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984) (holding that the defendant, whose car was
stopped on suspicion of drunk driving, was not "in custody" for Miranda purposes because there were
no coercive conditions that could cause a reasonable person to believe that he was is in a situation fairly
characterized as the functional equivalent of an arrest).
157. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 300 (1990).
158. Id. at 296.
159. Id.
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number of values important to our society. 160 We are better off when our
criminal justice system does not rely on confessions. 6 1 Recognizing this, the
Supreme Court created the prophylactic rules in Miranda to "permit a full op-
portunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination."' 162 The Court be-
lieved that the Miranda warnings would further that goal both by ensuring that
suspects have a real understanding of the Fifth Amendment privilege and by
showing the suspect "that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privi-
lege should he choose to exercise it." 163 An understanding of the privilege is a
necessary prerequisite for exercising it intelligently. 64 Trusting that the police
will honor the invocation of the privilege mitigates the coercive pressure to talk
during interrogation by limiting the suspect's concern that he will be punished
in some way for remaining silent.
165
The Miranda Court declared that the privilege against self-incrimination is
"the essential mainstay of our adversary system."' 166 Historically, the privilege
has its roots in the opposition to the inquisitorial procedures of the ecclesiasti-
cal courts and the horrors of the Star Chamber. 67 By placing the burden of in-
vestigation and prosecution on the government, the accusatorial system helps
preserve an appropriate balance between individual freedom and government
power.' 68 Related to this point and to the historical roots of the privilege is the
concern that the State will use cruel and inhumane methods to extract confes-
sions if they form the basis of the criminal justice system. 169 The accusatorial
system, and by extension the privilege against self-incrimination, also reflect
"the respect a government.., must accord to the dignity and integrity of its
citizens."' 170 This includes respect for individual autonomy-the ability to
choose whether and when to speak or remain silent.' 71 Finally, invoking the
privilege against self-incrimination promotes the quality of courts' factfmding
and, ultimately, the integrity of courts' criminal verdicts. Confessions may not
160. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
161. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-90 (1964).
162. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
163. Id. at 468.
164. See id. at 468-69.
165. See id.
166. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460; see also Weisselberg, supra note 119, at 141-45 (arguing that the
history of the privilege against self-incrimination demonstrates that it is bound up with other important
features of the accusatorial criminal justice system).
167. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1973); Leo, supra note 126, at 629.
168. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
169. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
170. Miranda, 384 U.S. at460.
171. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) ("[T]he fundamental purpose of the
Court's decision in Miranda was 'to assure that the individual's right to choose between speech and
silence remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process."' (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469)
(alteration in original)); Weisselberg, supra note 119, at 145-48 ("It is difficult to overstate the extent to
which our criminal system relies upon respect for autonomy." Id. at 146.).
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be as trustworthy as other types of evidence.
172
Many of these justifications for a strong privilege against self-incrimination
apply whenever an individual is being investigated by the State, not just at
trial. 173 But even if the heart of the Fifth Amendment privilege remains the de-
fendant's right to not testify, speaking with the police earlier undermines the
utility of invoking the Fifth Amendment at trial. 174 If ignorance of his rights or
the subtle pressures of interrogation lead a suspect to speak with the police,
then the ability to remain silent at trial, once he has a lawyer and has prepared a
defense, will do him no good. This is why the Withrow Court declared that
"'prophylactic' though it may be, in protecting a defendant's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda safeguards 'a fundamental trial
right.""' 175 And this is why Miranda refers repeatedly to ensuring a "continuous
opportunity to exercise" the Fifth Amendment privilege so that it does not be-
come a mere form of words.
176
C. Satisfying the Contingent Requirements of the Fifth Amendment
The Miranda decision identifies concerns of "constitutional dimension,"'
177
namely that the inherently coercive and largely hidden nature of police interro-
gation makes it difficult for courts to assess whether the Fifth Amendment has
been violated and leads to under-utilization of the Fifth Amendment privilege.
These concerns bring to light contingent constitutional requirements, as de-
fined in this Article: ensuring that suspects are aware of their Fifth Amendment
rights and have the unfettered opportunity to invoke them at any time. The
Court's response to the constitutional concerns it identified in Miranda is con-
sistent with the understanding of contingent constitutional requirements and of
the power and authority of the Court and Congress, expressed in this Article.
The Court outlined what it would take to address adequately the contingent
constitutional requirements, offered one solution that would satisfy its con-
cerns, and invited the states and Congress to come up with alternatives that
172. See Withrow, 507 U.S. at 692; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 448-49. In fact, concerns about the reliabil-
ity of confessions were the justification for the common law voluntariness requirement. See Leo, supra
note 126, at 625.
173. Miranda made clear for the first time that the Fifth Amendment applied outside of formal
criminal judicial proceedings. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
174. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 440-41 ("The natural concern which underlies [the Miranda line of
cases] is that an inability to protect the [Fifth Amendment] right at one stage of a proceeding may make
its invocation useless at a later stage."); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466 ("Without the protections
flowing from adequate warning and the rights of counsel, 'all the careful safeguards erected around the
giving of testimony... would become empty formalities in a procedure where the most compelling pos-
sible evidence of guilt, a confession, would have already been obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of
the police."' (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (Harlan, J. dissenting))).
175. Withrow, 507 U.S. at 691 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264
(1990) (alteration in original)).
176. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 467; see id. at 479.
177. Id. at 490.
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would be "at least as effective."' 178 If proffered alternatives did not satisfy the
contingent constitutional requirements, the Court stated that it would have to
apply its own exclusionary rule. The remaining question is whether Congress
did in fact create an alternative with Section 3501 that addressed the constitu-
tional concerns identified in Miranda as effectively as the Court's own warning
requirement and exclusionary rule.
III. WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE CONGRESS? SECTION 3501 Is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Congress passed Section 3501 as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968,179 at a time when crime and the Supreme Court's ac-
tive enforcement of civil rights were hot political issues. Section 3501's lan-
guage and legislative history make clear that it does not replace Miranda's pre-
scriptions with alternative procedural safeguards to ensure suspects'
knowledge of, or opportunity to exercise, their Fifth Amendment rights. The
statute simply rolls back the clock, restoring the old voluntariness test. The
statute fails to satisfy Miranda's admonition-which is the requirement for
legislative responses to contingent constitutional requirements generally-that
alternative policy solutions must satisfy the constitutional concerns as effec-
tively as the Court's proposed remedy.
A. The Statute and Legislative History
Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196880 takes
direct aim at a number of Supreme Court criminal procedure decisions. 181 Sec-
178. Id. at 467; see id. at 444. The Court wrote:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege which
might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of their creative rule-making ca-
pacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any
particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently
conducted. Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straightjacket which will handicap
sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect. We encourage Congress and the
States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights
of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless
we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of
their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
safeguards must be observed.
Id. at 467. The Court then described the Miranda warnings and exclusionary rule, and explained why
they satisfactorily protected the Fifth Amendment privilege. See id. at 467-76.
179. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501-02 (1994).
180. See id. §§ 3501-02
181. Section 3501(c) is intended to replace the Court's rule in Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S.
449 (1957), which excludes confessions obtained before a defendant is arraigned when there was an
unnecessary delay before the arraignment. See S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2215-16 (minority views of Senators Tydings, Dodd, Hart, Long of Missouri, Ken-
nedy of Massachusetts, Burdick, and Fong). Section 3503 allows eyewitness testimony at trial, even if
the witness identified the defendant at a line-up that did not satisfy the requirements of United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). See id. at 2216-18. Sections of the bill that did not pass would have re-
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tion 3501(a) seeks to repeal Miranda. The statute states that in federal criminal
trials, "a confession... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily
given."' 82 The statute goes on to list five factors that the judge should consider
when determining whether a defendant confessed voluntarily. The Miranda
warnings make an appearance in the list of factors, 8 3 but they are not required.
As in the traditional "totality of the circumstances" voluntariness test, the stat-
ute states that the judge should "take into consideration all the circumstances
surrounding the giving of the confession."' 84 And as with the traditional vol-
untariness test, the statute states that no factor is necessarily conclusive.'
85
Nothing in the statute would limit or compensate for the inherent coercive-
ness of custodial interrogation. Nothing in the statute would enhance a sus-
pect's ability to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege. And nothing in the
statute makes the judge's task of determining voluntariness any easier.
It is also helpful to look at what is-and what is not-included in the leg-
islative history of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. The major
justification offered in the Senate Judiciary Report on the statute is that confes-
sions play a crucial role in law enforcement, and that the Miranda decision has
dramatically curtailed the number of confessions given to police throughout the
country. The Senate Report recounts statistics and anecdotal testimony from
police departments, documenting the declining incidence of confessions.'
86
Nothing in the Senate Report suggests that Section 3501 will aid the integrity
of courts' Fifth Amendment determinations or ensure that suspects have a con-
tinuous and unburdened opportunity to invoke their Fifth Amendment privi-
lege. These concerns are never mentioned in the report. Indeed, the "right" in-
voked most often is the "traditional right of the people to have their
prosecuting attorneys place in evidence before juries the voluntary confessions
and incriminating statements made by defendants...." ,
187
The Senate Report devotes substantial energy toward building the case for
its authority to overturn Miranda. The Judiciary Committee emphasizes insti-
tutional competence, concluding that "Congress is better able to cope with the
problem of confessions than is the Court.', 18 8 The Report notes that the
stricted the federal courts' ability to address criminal procedure in the future by limiting the appellate
jurisdiction of the federal courts and the writ of habeas corpus. See id at 2139-40, 2150-53 (majority
report); Burt, supra note 4, at 123-24, 131.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a).
183. See id. § 3501(b). Two of the factors mentioned in the statute are "whether or not such defen-
dant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement
could be used against him," and "whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of
his right to the assistance of counsel." Id.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. See S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2128-32.
187. Id. at 2123.
188. Id at 2132.
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Miranda decision itself invited Congress to pass legislation concerning confes-
sions,' 89 but the carefully cropped quotation from Miranda omits the require-
ment that any congressional solution be as effective as the Court's.190 The
power to prescribe rules of evidence in the federal courts, according to the
Senate, allows Congress to replace the Supreme Court's Miranda exclusionary
rule.'
9 1
Other passages in the legislative history, however, indicate that Congress-
perhaps aware that its ability to overturn Miranda was tenuous at best-in-
tended to send a message or to educate the Supreme Court through Section
3501 with the hope that the Court itself would overturn Miranda.'92 "After all,"
the Judiciary Committee notes, "the Miranda decision itself was by a bare
majority of one, and with increasing frequency the Supreme Court has reversed
itself."'193 At another point, the Committee urges approval of the statute on the
grounds that "[p]assage of this bill with all of its legislative history... will
furnish an excellent record that will hopefully make an impression on some of
the Supreme Court Justices.' 94 One Senator remarked that "[I]f the Court will
not exert self-discipline, then it is the role of the legislative branch to express
its concern ..... 195 The legislative history contains as much angry rhetoric as it
does information to educate the Court. 196 Much of the language decries the
189. See id.
190. See id at 2132, 2137. The Senate Report includes the following lengthy excerpt from the
Miranda decision:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege which
might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of their creative rule-making ca-
pacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any
particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently
conducted. Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straightjacket which will handicap
sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect. We encourage Congress and the
States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights
of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.
Id. at 2137 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)). The very next sentence, which
completes the paragraph in the majority opinion, reads: "However, unless we are shown other proce-
dures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring
a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following procedures must be observed." Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 467
191. See S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2137.
192. This view is echoed to a more limited degree in the individual comments of Senator Bayh. The
Senator noted that the legislation would probably be held unconstitutional because it did not satisfy the
Court's requirement that congressional policy responses be as effective as the Court's prescription.
Senator Bayh went on to say, however, that the legislation "could serve.., as an admonition to the
Court that strong sentiment and cause exists against the further extension of the doctrine pronounced in
Miranda." Id. at 2247 (individual comments of Senator Bayh).
193. Id. at2138.
194. Id at 2133. Congress may have been exaggerating its own accomplishments here; one scholar
writing soon after the passage of § 3501 critiqued the factfmding that preceded passage of the bill. See
Burt, supra note 4, at 126 ("As a general matter, it can be said that entire congressional debate on all
sides of Title II was notably devoid of anything but the most speculative assertion of facts.").
195. S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2261 (individual com-
ments of Senator Scott).
196. See Burt, supra note 4, at 127.
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perceived epidemic of crime sweeping the nation, and the Court's apparent in-
difference. 197 The Judiciary Committee describes Miranda as a "most disas-
trous blow to the cause of law enforcement,"'' 98 and as "unreasonable, unreal-
istic, and extremely harmful." 99
Persuading the Court to change its mind was clearly a second best solution,
for the Judiciary Committee Report's section on Miranda concludes not with a
call for reversal by the Supreme Court, but with a confident assertion that Sec-
2tion 3501 and its substantive provisions would be upheld in court. 00 The leg-
islative history clearly states Congress's conclusion that the Supreme Court
misconstrued the Constitution in Miranda,20 1 and that Section 3501 is meant to
"offset the harmful effects of the Court decisions" by restoring the test for ad-
missibility of confessions in use before Miranda.2 °2
B. The Problems Section 3501 Poses
As the text and legislative history of Section 3501 show, the statute's single
goal is to aid the prosecution of criminals. The test for admission of confes-
sions supplied by Congress does not help courts faced with the difficult task of
evaluating custodial interrogations, and it does not force the police to give sus-
pects every opportunity to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege. Because
Congress's test for the admission of confessions does not satisfactorily address
the constitutional concerns raised in Miranda, it cannot supersede the Court's
own test.
Ineffective legislative responses to contingent constitutional requirements
can pose separation-of-powers problems, and Congress's imposition of the
voluntariness test as the sole measure of admissibility for confessions does so
in two ways. First, it undermines the judiciary's ability to satisfy its constitu-
tional obligations to decide cases and identify constitutional violations. Second,
197. See S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2260 (individual
comments of Senator Scott). In a joint statement, Senators Dirksen, Hruska, Scott, and Thurmond
warned:
The spectre of American society-the greatest in the history of the world-plunging into
chaos as the national fabric unravels into lawlessness is alarming.... No honest and consci-
entious effort to restore effective law enforcement and fair criminal justice-no matter how
many dollars are spent or wires tapped or guns controlled-can hope for success without
dealing with the technical problems of admissibility of evidence and appellate review of
criminal cases.
Id. at 2281-82.
198. Id. at 2127
199. Id. at 2132.
200. Seeid. at2138.
201. See id at 2136.
202. Id. at 2127. Senator Hugh Scott noted that § 3501 "would restore the test which had been in
use and considered constitutional until recent Supreme Court decisions, most notably Miranda v. Ari-
zona." Id. at 2261. See also Garcia, supra note 142, at 478, for a brief discussion of Congress's possible
goals in enacting § 3501.
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it substitutes Congress's understanding of what the Constitution requires for
that of the courts.
History has shown that courts cannot apply the voluntariness test for con-
fessions with consistency or precision. By forcing the federal courts to use an
evidentiary rule that is ill-suited for protecting Fifth Amendment rights, Sec-
tion 3501 undermines courts' ability to decide cases and identify constitutional
violations. With Section 3501, Congress limits another branch's ability to carry
out its essential functions. The Supreme Court has struck down statutes affect-
ing the jurisdiction and procedural rules of the federal courts before on the
ground that "substantial inroads into functions that have traditionally been per-
formed by the judiciary... [are] unwarranted encroachments upon the judicial
power .... "203 At least one Supreme Court Justice has acknowledged that rules
of procedure or evidence passed by Congress could pose separation-of-powers
concerns, potentially constituting "legislative interference with a court's inher-
ent authority [that] would run afoul of Article III ....
Congress did not attempt to redefine the Fifth Amendment privilege with
Section 3501. Both Congress and the Supreme Court agree that the privilege
against self-incrimination means that only voluntary confessions can be used
against a defendant in the prosecution's case in chief. Section 3501, however,
does reflect an understanding of what the privilege requires, given the police
interrogation and limits on court factfmding, that is at odds with the Supreme
Court's understanding. The statute undermines a suspect's ability to invoke the
Fifth Amendment, and it allows the vagaries of imprecise court factfinding to
miss Fifth Amendment violations. The statute works in only one direction-to
erode, in practical terms, the effective limits that the Fifth Amendment places
on the police and prosecutors.
This is the scenario that City of Boerne addresses: a statute that has the
practical effect of changing the protections offered by a constitutional right.
2 °5
203. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 84 (1982). Northern
Pipeline dealt with Congress's ability to establish Article I bankruptcy courts, a subject far removed
from the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule. Nonetheless, the Court's language is instructive:
[W]hen Congress creates a statutory right, it clearly has the discretion, in defining that fight, to
create presumptions, or assign burdens of proof, or prescribe remedies; it may also provide
that persons seeking to vindicate that right must do so before particularized tribunals created
to perform the specialized adjudicatory tasks related to that right. Such provisions do, in a
sense, affect the exercise ofjudicial power, but they are also incidental to Congress' [s] power
to define the right it has created. No comparable justification exists, however, when the right
being adjudicated is not of congressional creation. In such a situation, substantial inroads into
functions that have traditionally been performed by the judiciary cannot be characterized
merely as incidental extensions of Congress's power to define rights that it has created.
Rather, such inroads suggest unwarranted encroachments upon the judicial power of the
United States, which our Constitution reserves for Art. III courts.
Id. at 83-84.
204. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416,434 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring).
205. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, at 519-20, 534-35 (1997). Contrast this situation
with that posited in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980), and presented in Bush v. Lucas, 462
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It makes no difference that in the case of RFRA Congress expanded the pro-
tections of the First Amendment while in Section 3501 Congress restricted the
practical protections of the Fifth Amendment.2°6 There is also no basis for dis-
tinguishing congressional action under its Fourteenth Amendment Section 5
power from action under the power to make the rules of evidence and proce-
dure for the federal courts.
207
CONCLUSION
In Dickerson, the Fourth Circuit failed to notice the deficiencies of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act because it failed to appreciate
contingent constitutional requirements.20 8 The court asked whether every con-
fession given without the warnings prescribed by Miranda is involuntary, and
looking to the Supreme Court's post-Miranda jurisprudence, correctly deduced
that the answer is "no." 209 The Fourth Circuit then concluded that Congress
could do away with any protections offered by Miranda that swept beyond the
core, inherent requirements of the Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-
incrimination. 2 1 The court acknowledged that its interpretation of Miranda
raised concerns about the Supreme Court's authority to require Miranda
warnings, especially in state criminal proceedings. 21' The Fourth Circuit side-
stepped the issue, however, stating it was for academics to address.
212
It is a shame the Fourth Circuit did not expect more of Congress. Recog-
nizing that the Supreme Court has the power to identify, and craft rules respon-
sive to, "issues ... of constitutional dimension" 213 stemming from the practical
realities of the court system in today's society still leaves a role for the legisla-
ture. In fact, it may be time for Congress to revisit the subject of police interro-
gation.
Numerous scholars have questioned the practical efficacy of Miranda
U.S. 367, 368 (1983). Constitutional tort actions are not available to remedy rights violations if Con-
gress has created an effective alternative remedial scheme, because the practical protections or benefits
of the constitutional right are roughly the same under the legislature's system.
206. Katzenbach v. Morgan made clear that Congress could not pass laws that "in effect... re-
strict, abrogate, or dilute" constitutional protections. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10
(1966).
207. The two powers simply provide alternate routes to invade the Court's sphere of authority. If
anything, congressional authority would be more limited under its power to prescribe rules of evidence
and procedure for the courts; at least the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 power is aimed at remedying
constitutional violations.
208. To the Fourth Circuit, Miranda's conclusive presumptions are either dictated by the Constitu-
tion or by "convenience." Dickerson, 166 F.3d 663, 690-91 n.20 (4th Cir. 1999).
209. See id. at 688-91.
210. See id at 691-92
211. Seeid. at 691 n.21.
212. See id. (acknowledging that the Supreme Court's application of Miranda's exclusionary rule
was "an interesting academic question," but concluding that it had no bearing on the court's determina-
tion that "Miranda's presumptive conclusion is not required by the Constitution").
213. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966).
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warnings and the exclusionary rule in addressing the constitutional concerns
identified in the decision.214 One writer claims that the decision's preoccupa-
tion with the status of the suspect and, consequently, with the waiver of the
suspect's rights has shifted attention away from a more direct, central, and con-
structive question: what police interrogation practices should we permit?215
Seizing on this observation, one scholar suggests that Miranda actually makes
it harder for defendants to exclude coerced confessions, because courts and de-
fense lawyers focus so heavily on the bright line question of whether the police
216gave adequate warnings. Another scholar claims that Miranda does not ade-
quately protect the Fifth Amendment values that underlie the decision, because
the warnings do not effectively communicate the meaning or significance of
the Fifth Amendment privilege to suspects, and because they do not effectively
217deter police trickery.
On the other side of the debate are critics who claim that Miranda has seri-
ously damaged the ability of the police to fight crime by limiting confes-
sions.218 Placed in the context of contingent constitutional requirements, this
argument goes as follows: Because a number of remedies might effectively ad-
dress the constitutional concerns raised in Miranda, it is important to weigh the
policy implications of each possible remedy. Miranda's warning requirement
and exclusionary rule come at too great a cost to society, so a different remedy
is required. Related to this point is frustration over the fact that, despite inviting
experimentation by Congress and the states, Miranda has had the effect of sti-
fling innovation in techniques for safeguarding the Fifth Amendment and im-
214. There are other areas of scholarly attention as well. Some critics have questioned the strength
of the foundation the Warren majority laid for its holding in Miranda. See Office of Legal Policy, supra
note 4, at 497-99. They challenge the significance of instructional materials for interrogation as evidence
of what really happens in the police station. See Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L.
REv. 1417, 1446 (1985). They point out that the decision rests on skimpy precedent. See id. And, of
course, they contend that the decision misconstrues earlier Fifth Amendment case law. See Office of
Legal Policy, supra note 4, at 451 (concluding that "the Miranda rules are inconsistent with the original
understanding of the right against self-incrimination, and with the Supreme Court's resolution of the
same issues in its pre-Miranda case law"). Finally, one critic worries that the Miranda decision is based
on a novel vision of the relationship between the suspect and the police-a vision that fosters a view of
criminal suspects as victims and underdogs, a vision that is morally vacuous and that undermines respect
for the law. See Caplan, supra, at 1419 (concluding that Miranda "sent our jurisprudence on a hazardous
detour by introducing novel conceptions of the proper relationship between the suspect and authority. It
accentuated just those features of our system that manifest the least regard for truthseeking, that imagine
the criminal trial as a game of chance in which the offender should always have some prospect of vic-
tory, and that ultimately reflect doubt on the rectitude of our laws and institutions.... With this focus,
the offender became the victim."). See also id. at 1450, 1472 (noting that Miranda turns criminals into
victims).
215. See Andrew L. Frey, Modern Police Interrogation Law: The Wrong Road Taken, 42 U. PITT.
L. REv. 731, 734-36 (1981).
216. See Garcia, supra note 142, at 489-90.
217. See Ogletree, supra note 125, at 1826-27, 1830.
218. See Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on
Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1060, 1126, 1132 (1998).
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proving the effectiveness of police interrogation.2
9
These criticisms of Miranda may have merit. Perhaps Congress could ex-
plore some of the policy options proposed by Miranda's critics, such as video-
taping interrogations to help courts determine whether they were overly coer-
cive, or questioning suspects in the presence of a magistrate. 22 Or it may be
time for the Supreme Court to revisit the constitutional concerns implicated by
custodial interrogation or to refashion its own remedy for custodial interroga-
tion's contingent constitutional requirements.
Contingent constitutional requirements give the Supreme Court and Con-
gress the chance to develop a productive relationship. 221 Together, the branches
can draw on their institutional strengths and powers to vindicate constitutional
rights more effectively and at less cost to government and society than either
branch could on its own. In the Miranda context, Congress may be able to
regulate federal agents' conduct and craft procedural rules for the federal
courts in a way that improves the courts' factfinding ability in the area of cus-
todial interrogation, mitigates the pressure on suspects to waive Fifth Amend-
ment rights, and frees law enforcement from Miranda's rigid rules.
Until Congress or the Court readdress police interrogation, however,
Miranda remains binding constitutional law. The Court acted within its powers
to identify and remedy contingent constitutional violations stemming from the
closed-off and inherently coercive nature of police questioning. Because Sec-
tion 3501 does not offer an effective alternative for satisfying the contingent
requirements of the Fifth Amendment, the Court's remedy must stand.
219. See id. at 1129-30; Office of Legal Policy, supra note 4, at 506-10.
220. See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 218, at 1130-31.
221. See Monaghan, supra note 23, at 34 (arguing that congressional legislation concerning confes-
sions would not disrupt a productive Court-Congress relationship).
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